Owing to lags in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, central banks put much weight on forecasts of the future paths of output and inflation. So there has been considerable recent interest in forward-looking Taylor-type reaction functions. Using publicly available data on the Monetary Policy Committee's forecasts for UK inflation and output growth, 1997-2003, we examine how the coefficients in such reaction functions changed as we switched between ex post forecasts -those published after, and incorporating, the preceding interest rate decision -and ex ante forecasts -those presented to the MPC before that decision -and also as we vary the (forecast) horizon, out to eight quarters ahead. In our data set, the coefficients vary sensitively as the horizon/forecast basis changes. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the MPC tried aggressively to eliminate any predicted, ex ante, deviation of inflation from target immediately it emerged, with no apparent indication of intended inertia, or gradualism, in response. Nevertheless the time path of official short term interest rates during these years shows the usual record of consecutive similarly-signed small steps.
I. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine how the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in the UK set interest rates during the first six years of its existence. As Alan Greenspan stated (2004) , "In recognition of the lag in monetary policy's impact on economic activity, a preemptive response to the potential for building inflationary pressures was made an important feature of policy. As a consequence, this approach elevated forecasting to an even more prominent place in policy deliberations."
and later in the same speech, "While all, no doubt, would prefer that it were otherwise, there is no way to dismiss what has to be obvious to every monetary policymaker: The success of monetary policy depends importantly on the quality of forecasting."
Thus policy makers will react to forecasts of the key variables, inflation and some measure of output gap or growth, not to their predetermined values, as in the standard Taylor reaction function, i t = a + b 1 ( t -*) + b 2 y t + b 3 i t-1 (1) where i is the nominal interest rate, the current rate of inflation, y is the estimated output gap, and the final term (b 3 i t-1 ) is usually included to account for the empirical evidence of auto-correlation in the time path of interest rates, (Taylor, 1993 (Taylor, , 1999 .
Of course, predetermined values for output and inflation may be important determinants of predicted future values for those same variables, but they will surely never be the only determinants of those forecasts. A cursory inspection of the published fan charts in the published Inflation Reports for inflation, as defined in terms of the target RPIX variable set out for the MPC during these years (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , and for the growth of output, shows their paths to be frequently humpshaped, which is difficult to achieve with a simple linear relationship between forecast output (and inflation) and past output and inflation.
Be that as it may, a study of the decision-making process of an MPC should ideally use the same forecasts that the MPC has before it when it takes that decision. Moreover, with more resources and a strong incentive, the inflation forecasts of a central bank may well out-perform those of the private sector, see, for the USA, Romer and Romer (2000) , but for a more sceptical interpretation, Faust, Swanson and Wright (2004) .
The criticism that the standard Taylor reaction function is not forward looking, is neither new nor the most fundamental of recent critiques. Let me take the second point first. Having categorized the standard decision-making process of modern monetary policy, Svensson (2004) goes on to note that, "This process makes the current instrument-rate decision a very complicated function of the large amounts of data and judgment that have entered into the process. I believe that it is not very helpful to summarize this function as a simple reaction function such as a Taylor rule. Furthermore, the resulting complicated reaction function is a reduced form, which depends on the central-bank objectives, its view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, the data the central bank has collected, and the judgment it has exercised. It is the endogenous complicated result of a complicated process. In no way is this reaction function structural, in the sense of being invariant to the central bank's view of the transmission mechanism and private-sector behaviour, or the amount of information and judgmental adjustments. Still, much current literature treats monetary policy as characterized by a given reaction function that is essentially structural and invariant to changes in the model of the economy. Treating the reaction function as a reduced form is a first step in a sensible theory of monetary policy."
Perhaps the most important facet of this recent critique of treating Taylor reaction functions as structural is that a central bank's reactions in adjusting its operational short term interest rate will, and should, depend on its beliefs not only about the values of the parameters in its model(s) of the economy, but also their uncertainty, and how private sector agents form their own expectations of such values; indeed this was the main issue at the 2004 ECB Conference on `Monetary policy and imperfect knowledge'; see the papers presented there by Adalid et al., Cogley and Sargent, Küster and Wieland, Orphanides and Williams, and Walsh. As the central bank's views about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy change, so will its reaction function. Our available sample helps to limit the likelihood of reaction function changes for the following reasons. The time frame of this empirical exercise is quite short, 1997-2003 . During this period the main forecasting model of the Bank of England (the MTMM model) 2 , the inflation target (a continuous 2½% rate of growth of RPIX), the conditioning assumption for interest rates in the published forecast fan chart (held constant over the published two year horizon at the level set at the immediately preceding meeting of the MPC) and, until the final quarter of our period, the Governor and the Deputy Governor responsible for Monetary Analysis, Eddie George and Mervyn King, all remained unchanged. Such constancy may help to protect this exercise from the potential structural changes just mentioned. Then from mid 2003 to mid 2004 all these previous constants altered. A new Bank forecasting model (BEQM, pronounced Beckham, as in the football celebrity) was unveiled; the inflation target was shifted to a continuous rate of 2% on the harmonised Consumer Price Index; the main conditioning assumption for interest rates became a path consistent with the money market yield curve; and Mervyn King took over as Governor. Future research workers in this field will have to test carefully for structural breaks in 2003/4. Not surprisingly, this is not the first paper to consider forward-looking Taylor-type reaction functions. In their excellent survey of `Estimating TaylorType Rules: An Unbalanced Regression', Siklos and Wohar (2004) address `Selected Econometric Aspects of Taylor Rules' in their Section 2, and include the use of forward-looking expectation under issue vi. Even since they wrote, numerous other papers using this same forward-looking approach have become available, notably Kuttner (2004) , Dieppe, et al. (2004) , Romer and Romer (2004) , Boivin (2004) , Jansson and Vredin (2003) and Berg, et al. (2004) . Of these, the paper by Kuttner is closest to this work, since he examines how the instrument rule reacts to the forecast of inflation and the output gap four quarters hence (t = 4) for four countries, USA, Sweden, New Zealand and in the UK.
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In comparison with Kuttner, there are two contributions in this paper. First Kuttner uses the published forecasts, which are based on the interest rate decision made at the previous MPC meeting, after the decision has been made (an ex post forecast). Such forecasts, will by construction, be different from the ex ante forecasts in those cases whenever the MPC decided, in some large part on the basis of such ex ante forecasts, to change its instrument. As described in the next Section, I use publicly available estimates, authorised by the MPC itself (1999), of the monetary policy transmission mechanism to attempt, by reverse engineering, to reconstruct what the ex ante forecasts before the MPC would have been. As shown later, the difference between looking at ex ante and ex post forecasts in a forward-looking Taylor-type reaction function can be substantial.
The second main difference is that the forecast horizon is extended from the year ahead forecast in Kuttner to two years, eight quarters.
4 This is important because the lags in the transmission mechanism, (see MPC 1999), are so long that monetary actions taken now will not have their main effect on inflation until the second year.
So an inflation targeting central bank, like the Bank of England, is likely to place special weight on its inflation forecasts at their second-year horizon. Indeed, the results not only show the estimated coefficients changing dramatically as we move from a four quarter ahead (t = 4) to a seven or eight quarter ahead forecast (t = 7,8), but also are consistent with what Svensson (2004) describes as a targeting rule whereby interest rates are adjusted until the forecast inflation rate is brought back (very quickly) into line with the target rate of inflation at that horizon.
That said, the MPC's procedures have been quite different in some respects from those which Svensson (ibid) and Woodford (2004) would regard as optimal. First, it was based on a constant interest rate assumption, and Svensson and Woodford would prefer a projection of an expected path of rates. This debate is on-going. But this paper is just attempting to describe how the MPC behaved, a positive exercise, not the normative question of how it should have behaved. The apparent focus by the MPC on inflation some 7/8 quarters hence is also criticised by Svensson and Woodford. They would prefer an approach that effectively minimised a loss function in which deviations (from their desired levels) of both output and inflation at all future dates (appropriately discounted), starting at the earliest time at which monetary policy affected any of these 4 The second paper with the greatest similarity to this study is that by Jansson and Vredin (2003) , particularly since the Riksbank' approach to the monetary policy decision has been so akin to that of the MPC in the UK. Like the MPC, "the Riksbank declares that the forecast horizon for inflation lies twelve to twenty four months ahead", and they use a constant interest rate conditioning assumption, (ibid, pages 10 and 6). Their forecasts are, however, for annual, not quarterly, data and their time period, 1992-98, is different. Nevertheless, as described later, their results have several similarities to our own.
5 Similarly questions about the adequacy, or otherwise, of the MTMM forecasting model used in the Bank fall outside the scope of this paper.
variables, entered.
6 There are two points to be made here. First, the Bank of England does not have goal independence in the sense of Fischer, see Capie, Goodhart, Fischer and Schnadt (1994) . Its objective is set for it by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
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As stated on the first page of the first Inflation Report issued by the MPC, (August 1997), "The Chancellor announced details of the Government's inflation target in his Mansion House speech on 12 June. The operational target for monetary policy is an underlying inflation rate, measured by the twelvemonth increase in the RPI excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX), of 2½%. The MPC will set interest rates with reference to prospects for inflation two years or so ahead. This is for two reasons. First, changes in interest rates take up to two years to have their maximum effect on inflation, and so monetary policy has to be forward-looking. Second, the target measure of inflation is the increase in prices over the previous twelve months, and so is itself a lagging indicator of inflationary pressure.
The new framework recognises that the actual inflation rate will on occasion depart from its target as a result of shocks and disturbances. If inflation moves away from the target by more than 1 percentage point, the Governor of the Bank is required, on behalf of the MPC, to send an open letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, giving reasons for the divergence, details of the policy actions being taken to deal with it and the period within which inflation is expected to return to the target. An article in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (August 1997, pages 241-47) sets out the changes to the monetary policy framework in more detail." 6 Thus Woodford (2004) states, p. 28, "In fact, the sort of optimal target criteria that can be derived using the method of Giannoni and Woodford (2002) involve much nearer-term projections than those that are officially targeted by the Bank of England or other inflation-targeting central banks. For example, while the targeting criteria discussed in the appendix involve weighted averages of projections for many different future quarters, it is the projection for one or two quarters in the future that receives the greatest weight. Thus the optimal target criteria do not merely describe the state that one wishes to reattain once the effects of recent disturbances have worked themselves out; they also characterize the optimal transition dynamics following a disturbance."
7 The Taylor-rule literature has largely ignored the point that the central bank is an agent, not a principal, in the conduct of monetary policy. For a discussion of how that might influence the reactions and policies of central banks, see Bray and Goodhart (2002) . Under Svensson's and Woodford's preferred approach, it might also seem peculiar that there is no formal mention whatsoever of the path of output in the Chancellor's remit. In my view the sole focus on inflation is more appearance than reality. In so far as the shock driving forecast inflation from its target is a demand shock, then correcting the deviation between forecast and target for inflation will tend to do the same for output. In so far as the deviation is caused by a supply shock, the implicit assumption is that any severe supply shock, for example a tripling in the price of oil, would trigger the 1% inflation band, mentioned above in the passage from the August 1997 Inflation Report. If so, the Bank would write an open letter to the Chancellor indicating, among other things, their proposals for the speed of returning to the inflation target. This latter would, no doubt, involve, "the standard efficiency condition of equality between the marginal rates of substitution and the marginal rates of transformation between the target variables, the former given by the monetary-policy loss function, the latter given by the transmission mechanism of monetary policy." which Svensson, (ibid, p. 4), supports. Moreover, the Chancellor could have different views on these functions, especially the loss function, and could write back to the MPC to suggest some alternative paths.
The MPC has thus, in my view, had an implicit two state approach. In the bad state, in which the inflation band is presumed to be broken, they would undertake a formal exercise equating the MRS and MRT. In the good state, in which the intervening paths look OK, focus on driving the inflation forecast into line with target at the two year horizon. What has been surprising to all concerned is that a bad state involving a triggering of the 1% bands has never yet happened. That has not, however, been at the expense of greater volatility in output. As Benati (2004) has shown, this latter volatility has fallen since the adoption of inflation targeting in 1993; indeed there has been no single quarter with negative growth since then.
While the absence of bad states is NICE (non-inflationary consistent expansion, quoting from a speech by Governor King (2003) ), it has led commentators to accuse the MPC of a much greater concentration on inflation alone, than would prove to be the case if economic conditions became much rougher. An example of such criticism is provided by B. Friedman (2004) in his comment on Faust and Henderson (2004) .
Be that as it may, no one else, to my knowledge, has yet tested empirically whether the MPC has, in practice, acted as it claimed that it would do at the outset; that is to drive the inflation forecast into line with target at the two year horizon. This paper tests this hypothesis and finds it to be consistent with the data.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section II we describe the data that we use. In Section III we report the results of the empirical exercises. We discuss some of the puzzling aspects of these results in Section IV, which also concludes.
II. The Data Base
Since 1997, the Bank of England's Inflation Report has continuously reported projections for four-quarter inflation (RPIX series) and real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, (mode, median, mean, and measures of both variance and, more recently, skew) for an eight-quarter horizon. The inflation projections are available from the outset of the Inflation Report, starting in Q1 1993, but the Bank only began publishing the associated output growth forecasts from the August 1997 Inflation Report after the Chancellor of the Exchequer had delegated operational independence to the Bank in May. So, as noted earlier, the sample period is, perforce, short. As reported in Goodhart (2004) , and can be seen from inspection of the fan charts in the Inflation Reports, there has been relatively little skew in these projections, so the choice between the different measures of central tendency should make little difference. We used the mode.
Most reaction function estimates use data for the output gap, see Siklos and Wohar (2004) . There is a close relationship between output gap and output growth, see for example Sauer and Sturm (2003) and Nierhaus and Sturm (2003) ; and indeed output growth data can be transformed into output gap data, as Kuttner does (op cit, p. 99). Estimating the output gap (as in Kuttner or elsewhere), however, requires contentious assumptions which we would prefer to avoid. Indeed, given the difficulties in estimating output gaps there are strong grounds for arguing that policy makers should focus on output growth rather than on gaps. As Orphanides and Williams (2004, p. 6) note, mismeasurement of the natural rate (of unemployment or output) can be mitigated by replacing the data for the gaps by data for the growth of output/unemployment, and they further cite in support of using output growth data, (footnote 6), McCallum (1999) , Orphanides (2003) , Orphanides et al. (2000) , Leitemo and Lonning (2002) and Walsh (2003) .
A second, somewhat related, difficulty with the output data, of ex post actuals, is that these are subject to continuous revision over a considerable number of subsequent years.
8 Moreover in the last couple of decades in the UK the revisions have not been random in effect; for a variety of reasons the initial estimates have tended to be revised upwards over time (the first estimates have a downwards bias). I have tried to use initial, contemporary data on output growth. This has been facilitated by an exercise that the Bank has done, undertaken by Castle and Ellis, reported in their Quarterly Bulletin, (BEQB 2002) , to provide on their website Excel sheets of contemporaneous estimates of output, available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/gdpdatabase. The output growth data, used here, are taken from that, until 2001 Q3 when that data set ended; the remaining data are taken from ONS estimates prior to the revision in the Autumn of 2003. I did not, however, take the very first estimate of output growth since that is known to be provisional, and based on partial data. The MPC often bases its assessments on a combination of the initial ONS estimate and an assortment of other, e.g. survey, data. Instead, I used output growth data, for a particular date, after a couple of observations for that date have become available and the data have somewhat settled down.
The data series for actual and forecast output growth are shown in Table 1 , with the forecasts relating to a particular output date set out horizontally, thus the output growth in 2003 Q3 was estimated at 1.89%, and its forecast a year earlier in 2002 Q3 (t + 4) was 2.94%, and in 2001 Q3 (t + 8) was 2.11%. Note that forecasts are completed in the middle of each quarter, (February, May, August, November), so the current quarter (t = 0) also has to be forecast.
By comparison, there are few problems with the data for inflation. Over this time period the inflation target was defined as achieving a target rate of 2.5% for a version of the Retail Price Index (RPI) which excluded the direct effects of interest rate changes, e.g. on mortgage interest payments, i.e. RPIX. The data for RPIX are collected by survey, and once obtained almost never revised. 9 The series of forecasts for RPIX (% change on the same quarter a year ago) are available back to 1993, though for our purposes we only use data from 1997. These latter are shown in Table 2 .
The forecasts are made in the mid-quarter month, say February in Q1, using as an input into the forecast the level of interest rates established by the Monetary Policy Committee in the previous month, in our example in January. 9 There is one statistical detail that needs a mention. The operational series for the inflation target in the UK is monthly. A letter would have to be written in any month in which the target was missed by more than 1%, and repeated if after three months inflation was still more than 1% away from target, see Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, (1997, p. 247) . While there is an equivalent quarterly series for inflation, hardly anyone pays it any attention. So I have taken as my ex post outcome series the inflation datum for the final month of each quarter, March, June, September, December. In this respect the outcome series differs (marginally) from that used by Clements (2004) who uses the quarterly outcome data.
The forecast was then conducted on the basis of the conditioning assumption that interest rates were then held constant over the full forecast horizon of eight quarters.
10 Then the MPC considers, e.g. at its February meeting, whether it is content with the consequential profiles for output and inflation. If not, it can review what effect an interest rate adjustment would have on these profiles. If the MPC does decide to make an adjustment to interest rates, say an increase of ½% in official short-term rates, then the profiles are reworked to show the consequence of interest rates being ½% higher (than in the initial forecast) throughout the forecast (until t = 8), and this latter, reworked, forecast is what is then published in the immediately following Inflation Report.
This procedure of using a constant-interest-rate (CIR) conditioning assumption has been the subject of contention, having been both strongly attacked (Svensson, 2003 (Svensson, , 2004 Martijn and Samiei, 1999 , Meyer, 2001 , Woodford, 2004 and defended (Goodhart 2001 and . It is not the purpose of this paper to go over that ground again. It suffices here to note that this was the way the exercise was actually done during the years studied here.
The implication, however, is that the relevant forecast for influencing policy decisions is not the published forecast (in the Inflation Report) which shows the forecast ex post the interest rate decision, but the initial ex ante forecast (before the decision is taken) which is not published. It is, however, possible to construct a proxy for such ex ante forecasts. In 1999 the Monetary Policy Committee authorised a publication on 'The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy', (largely prepared by the staff), showing diagrammatically on page 12 the effect of a 1% change in interest rates, maintained for one year and then reversed, on both output and inflation on the basis of two alternative simulations. Since there seemed few grounds for choosing between these, I took the average, mean, of the two, and translated that, by eye, into numerical estimates.
For my purposes, however, I want a rule of thumb for a change in interest rates maintained over two years, until t = 8, not just one. For inflation there is no problem, since the lags are so long that the results are equivalent.
11 But for output, I have had to make an ad hoc assumption about the effect of the extra year's maintenance. Moreover, interest rate changes are not made only in the forecasting (Inflation Report, IR) month, but in the two preceding months as well, (though the frequency of making such adjustments, for some fairly obvious reasons, is higher in the IR month than in the other (not IR) months). So we need to take account of these as well.
Be that as it may, the rule-of-thumb adjustments to be made to the forecasts for interest rate changes are shown in Table 3 , and the actual historical changes in interest rates, and the resulting implied changes in the forecasts are shown in Tables 4 and 5 (for output growth and inflation). Note that a change in interest rates in say Q1 1999 will affect output in Q2 1999, Q3 1999, etc., so the way that we have set up the tables, the effects run diagonally downwards in Table  4 and Table 5 .
Then to recreate the ex ante, initial forecasts, we simply add back Tables 4  and 5 to Tables 1 and 2, giving Tables 6 and 7 . Again note that the interest rate decision in the forecast month relates to the ex ante forecast going diagonally down to the right. For ease of exposition we also rotate these Tables around to show the forecasts, for output and inflation, relating to each interest rate adjustment horizontally in Tables 8 and 9 . We are now in a position to relate interest rate changes during this short period both to the ex ante forecasts and actuals for inflation and output growth, and also to the ex post forecasts -for comparison -though this latter is a misspecification.
III. The Empirical Results
Since official interest rates are frequently left unchanged, and, when changed, are adjusted usually in steps of 25 basis points, or multiples thereof, there is a case for using two-stage probit analysis, e.g. how much do the explanatory variables have to alter to provoke a non-zero response, and, given a decision to react, how large will the change be. In practice, most empirical work on Central Bank reaction functions has used basic, straightforward OLS. Both to allow simple comparison, and owing to our woefully short data set, we have followed that same practice.
What we show in Table 10 is a series of regressions (using the ex ante forecast data) in which the level of interest rates is regressed against inflation and output growth at differing forecast horizons (and also the current actual data) plus a constant and a lagged dependent variable. The results are striking.
The inflation forecast has an extremely large, and highly significant, coefficient at t = 7 and 8, but this coefficient falls rapidly towards zero as the horizon shortens, being statistically insignificant from t + 5 down to t + 0, and with actual data. In contrast, the coefficient on output growth is insignificant at long horizons, t + 7 and t + 8. Then the coefficient rapidly increases both in (positive) size and in significance, reaching a maximum between t + 3 and t + 5.
The coefficient is slightly smaller at t + 0, and with actual data, but remains highly significant. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable remains extremely close to unity, and well defined with small standard errors, from t + 8 to t + 1. At the shortest horizon, t + 0 and actuals, the coefficient drops below unity, and with the actuals, but never with the forecasts, the coefficient is, just, significantly different from unity.
With the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable being effectively at unity, this suggests that the appropriate form of the regression should be in first difference form. Consequently the constant in the regression in levels should have, and does have, a zero coefficient, though rising to positive values at t + 0, and with the actuals.
The fit (R 2 ) remains virtually unchanged, around 0.92 at all horizons, and the DW ratio is close to 2.
We then re-ran the equation in first difference form, 12 adding two lags of the prior quarterly change in interest rates, to test for possible gradualism, (on gradualism see Sack, 1998 and Sack and Wieland, 2000; Goodhart, 1999; Woodford 2003) . The results are shown in Table 11 . As expected, these results confirm those of the equation in levels. The coefficient on inflation is unchanged at t + 8 and t + 7, but then falls more gradually than in the levels version, remaining significant until t + 4. The coefficient on output growth is again insignificant at the longest horizons, t + 7, t + 8; it is highly significant between t + 2 and t + 6; it is positive, but loses significance at the shortest horizons, t + 0 and actuals. Although the first lag of the change in interest rates is usually positive, it is never significant, and the second lag is negative throughout, though insignificant. Unlike the levels equation, the fit, for an equation in first differences, is extremely good at the longer horizons t + 7, t + 8; then falls to moderate levels at horizons from t + 6 to t + 1 (around 0.4 to 0.5), and then drops dramatically at the shortest horizons, t + 0, actuals; one can note that it was at these shortest horizons that the lagged dependent variable diverged from unity, so a first difference format is misspecified.
Since the lagged changes in interest rates were not significant, we omitted them and re-ran the regressions, Table 12 . The only additional point to note here is that both the fit and the DW ratio now decline even more at the short horizons.
Recall that we are running these regressions on our reconstruction of the ex ante forecast facing the MPC, that is the forecasts that they would have seen and published if they would have made no interest rate changes at all since the previous IR forecast. Put another way, we adjusted the ex post forecasts to add back our estimate of the effect of the interest rate change itself. What would happen to our regressions if we just run the regressions on the raw, ex post IR forecast data? This is shown in the exactly equivalent Tables 13, 14, 15.
In these regressions the coefficient on the inflation forecast is never significant, though usually positive in the first differenced format. The coefficient on output growth loses it prior significance between t + 3 and t + 6, but, with the adjustment factors for output being small at short horizons, the coefficients at t + 2 and below remain unchanged. The lagged dependent variable in the levels equation still remains close to unity until short horizons. With these unadjusted data, both the value of R 2 and DW fall in the levels equation at the longer horizons, making it appear that the shorter horizon runs fit the data better. In the first difference format, the steady decline in R 2 from t + 8 to t + 0 is no longer apparent.
Assume that an observer only had access to current actual data; or to the actual ex post forecasts, but did not adjust for the effect of, (the interaction between), the interest rate changes themselves and the resulting ex post forecasts of output and inflation. What might he have deduced? First, there was no sign at all of the MPC reacting to inflation, (against orders!). Second, there was a large, and highly significant, response to current output growth, which is very much larger in the long run than in the short, given the lagged dependent variable coefficient of about 0.85. Third, that the MPC responded more to current, than to forecast, output growth. Fourth, this same high, but less than unity, value of this coefficient suggests an interest rate smoothing procedure (gradualism).
13
13 Compare, as a cross-check, the results shown here, using the ex post forecast series, with those provided by Kuttner in his Table 2 , in which he uses the growth forecast, as well as the output gaps. The closest association is between his four quarter estimate for the UK and the forecast with my data for a horizon of t = 3 in Compare this mis-specified assessment with the results of, what I claim to be, the correct specification. Here the assessment of behaviour runs as follows: The MPC concentrates its focus on the ex ante forecast of inflation at t + 8 and t + 7 (n.b. the highest R 2 in the first difference format Tables 11 and 12) , and changes interest rates enough to drive forecast inflation back into line with target. This is exactly in line with what the MPC claimed that it would do, in the opening page of its first Inflation Report (August 1997), as reported earlier. Note that the estimated adjustment factor for inflation at t + 8 is about 0.3, i.e. a 1% change in interest rates affects inflation by 0.3% after two years. With our coefficient at t + 8 equal to 2.3, this suggests that any 1% deviation of forecast inflation from target is immediately offset by an 0.7% response from policy.
14 Naturally, given this, almost totally offsetting and immediate, policy response, the ex post IR, unadjusted, forecasts show no residual relationship of interest rates with inflation at all. Moreover, since it is assumed that interest rates do not affect inflation at horizons below t + 4, there should be no such response to short run and current data which are, in effect, totally irrelevant, bygone data in any case.
Because of the close links between inflation at t + 4 and output growth at t + 0, the finding of a close link between ex ante forecasts of inflation at t + 8, t + 7 and the current change in interest rates, becomes observationally similar to (though econometrically somewhat better than) a relationship between ex ante forecasts of output growth between about t + 3 and t + 5 and current changes in interest rates. Although the MPC is focussing (correctly) on predicted (ex ante) In both the coefficient on output growth becomes insignificant, or incorrectly signed, once forecast inflation is entered at the relevant horizon. The most obvious difference is that the lagged change in interest rates in Sweden is a significant determinant of the current change in interest rates, but not in our results. Note, however, that the Riksbank only began to publish forecasts from 1996; that there was a conscious intention to proceed gradually to the inflation target at the outset; and that the shocks affecting Sweden in this period may well have been greater than those affecting the UK. For all these reasons, Sweden may, indeed, have followed a more gradualist path than the UK. But the long-run coefficient on inflation growth in Sweden, at about 2.13, is close to that estimated here, and well above that estimated using current, or short horizon, data. Both forecast sets use ex ante forecasts.
future inflation and, hence, output growth, auto-correlation between current and forecast output growth leads to a, purely statistical, relationship between current output growth and current interest rate changes. Again the ex ante forecast data show the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable to be, as close as econometrics normally can get, exactly unity. As deviations between forecast and output occur, the MPC immediately changes interest rates by enough to drive forecast back into line with target.
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There is, therefore, no difference between short and long-run responses, with no apparent attempt at interest rate smoothing, no conscious gradualism. That these features show up in this data set, when using actual current data, is again simply the result of misspecification.
IV. Some Puzzles
It is relatively rare to document a case where policy to control a variable, in this instance inflation, has been so successful that the ex post relationship between the target variable and the instrument becomes insignificant. Yet this is what we find here, see Tables 13, 14 , 15. This possibility is well known in the literature, e.g. Kareken and Solow, 1963 , Tobin, 1970 , Buiter, 1984 , but there have been few attested examples. It does, however, raise the problem of why, and how, current inflation came to be so strongly significant in most prior tests of Taylor-type reaction functions using contemporaneous actuals, given that most of the time the achievement of price stability was the prime objective of the authorities.
The UK experience in the years of our sample, 1997-2003, was, however, remarkable for its success in stabilising inflation around its target level. The variance of actual inflation, as measured by RPIX, around the target of 2.5% was 15 One suggestion that has been made, both in private and in public, for example Martijn and Samiei, (1999) , is that the Bank in effect publishes phoney forecasts, at least near to the two year horizon. Because it does not `look good' to have forecast inflation at this horizon deviate significantly from target, it is suggested that the ex post forecast will be shown as achieving the target at t = 7/8, whatever the private beliefs/estimates of the MPC and the Bank's forecasting staff. If so, the techniques used here in practice guarantees that the results would show a large reaction by the MPC to the estimated ex ante inflation forecast at this horizon! This would, however, have involved a conspiracy of so many persons, not only MPC members but also the forecasting staff of the Monetary Analysis division in the Bank, that any such falsification would have leaked and ruined the reputation of the Bank into the bargain. The suggestion is unworthy.
There may, however, be more subtle forms of bias. The Fisher relationship between expected future inflation and nominal interest rates could easily cause current market rates to rise; and a policy-making body could be reacting to current market rates, not to future inflation. Note, however, that the results here show a response of interest rates of more than twice the expected deviation of inflation from target. That is much more consistent with a determined policy response than a passive mode of reaction. minuscule 16 as measured either by historical standards, (see Benati, 2004) , or compared to most other countries. Outcomes have been less successful in previous periods, and perhaps in other countries. In so far as actual inflation deviates to a significant and worrying extent from target, pressures will build up on the authorities to respond, irrespective of the belief that only future inflation reacts to current interest rates. Moreover, given the autocorrelation in economies, current deviations of inflation from target may well indicate forecast, future deviations of inflation from target. Thus, one seems to reach the rather odd conclusion that such reaction functions, using actual contemporaneous data, have been effectively identified by the authorities' comparative failure in those cases to achieve their supposed objective.
The second problem that arises from these results is perhaps even more difficult. The first difference regressions (Table 11) suggest that the MPC sought to offset, immediately and almost one-for-one, any emerging deviation of forecast inflation, (at its chosen horizon t + 7, t + 8) from target. There was no apparent indication of gradualism, of short run response being much less than long-run responses, in these results. Yet simple observation of the time path of interest rates, Chart 1, reveals that the actual auto-correlation of interest rate changes, with a high ratio of continuations of small steps of the same sign relative to reversals, has been just as high during the MPC years as before.
There seems again to be an anomaly between these regression results which appear to indicate that the MPC was not aiming at gradualism, and had no overt intention, during these years, of moving in small planned steps, and the evidence of the actual time path of interest rate changes which show a series of same-signed small steps in these years, just as much as in preceding years. This is, perhaps, akin to the problem that systematic, intentional gradualism in official interest rates ought to be predictable; yet there is evidence, in the USA (Rudebusch and Wu, 2004 ; also see Diebold and Li, 2003; Duffee, 2002; Carriwo et al., 2003; Rudebusch, 2002) , and in Japan (Thornton, 2004) , that the money market yield curve has not seemed successful as a predictor of future short, official, rates. This is, however, a large and particularly difficult subject. It deserves, but will have to await, additional future research.
V. Conclusion
All the results of this work need to be subject to the major qualification that the time period, and hence sample size, is short. Nevertheless the results suggest that the MPC responded aggressively to any deviation of ex ante forecast inflation from its target, so much so, and so successfully, that there is no residual significant relationship between ex post inflation at any horizon, from current actual to the ex post forecast at t + 8, and nominal interest rates in this period. It would not have been possible for an observer to deduce what the MPC was really doing if she was to run a Taylor-type reaction function using current actual or ex post forecasting data during this short period. Perhaps the success of prior empirical tests of finding significant effects of current inflation on nominal interest rates has been because inflation targeting was either not being attempted so wholeheartedly, or just less successfully.
An even more complex problem arises because these results suggest that the MPC did not intend to build gradualism into its own behaviour, 17 and yet gradualism in the shape of consecutive series of similarly signed small steps in interest rates occurred nonetheless. The explanation of this conundrum must await further research. 17 This accords with my own recollections as a member of the MPC during the first three years of its existence. Apart from a very few occasions, (the first few months until August 1997 possibly being one such), there was, as I recall, no expectation, no plan, for initiating a series of small steps in interest rates in the same direction. That said, there clearly have been periods when Central Banks have consciously aimed to bring about such a series of similarly signed small steps, the `measured' changes in interest rates signalled by the FOMC in 2004/2005 being a recent, clear example. 8 4 8 5 8 6 8 7 8 8 8 9 9 0 9 1 9 2 9 3 9 4 9 5 9 6 9 7 9 8 9 9 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 I n t e r e s t r a t e 17 + The effect of an increase in interest rates being a reduction in output and, subsequently, in inflation, (and vice versa). The effects are assumed to be symmetrical. 
